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TRUST AS “UNCORPORATION”: 
A RESEARCH AGENDA 
Robert H. Sitkoff* 
Trust has long been a competitor of corporation as a form of busi-
ness organization.  Though corporation today dominates trust for operat-
ing enterprises, trust dominates corporation in certain specialized niches.  
The market value of these niches measures in the trillions of dollars.  Yet 
the modern business trust has only recently begun to be subjected to 
scholarly inquiry.  Accordingly, this essay outlines a research agenda for 
the study of the trust—in particular, the modern statutory business trust—
as a form of business organization.  Put into the parlance of the confer-
ence on which this symposium issue is based, this essay is a call for re-
search on the business trust as “uncorporation.” 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this essay is to outline a research agenda for the study of 
the modern business trust—in particular, the statutory business trust—as a 
form of business organization.  Despite its extraordinary capital markets and 
transactional significance, the modern business trust is not well understood.  
Illustrations of this point abound.  Take the brochure that advertised the con-
ference on which this special issue is based: 
For the past 200 years business law and scholarship has been dominated 
by a single business form—the corporation.  Indeed, the study of busi-
ness organizations is often called “corporate law,” and business lawyers 
are often referred to as “corporate lawyers.”  The age of corporate domi-
nance may, however, be coming to an end.  The last decade has seen the 
rapid development of new types of business associations, including lim-
ited liability companies and limited liability partnerships . . . . We have 
also seen increased flexibility in existing business forms such as the lim-
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University.  The author thanks Omri Ben-Shahar, Rich-
ard Brooks, Charlotte Crane, Joel Dobris, Tracey George, Henry Hansmann, John Langbein, Daria Roithmayr, 
Larry Ribstein, Max Schanzenbach, Steven Schwarcz, James Speta, Emerson Tiller, Albert Yoon, and work-
shop participants at the University of Illinois’s Conference on “Uncorporation: A New Age” for helpful com-
ments and discussion; Ben Frey and Jeremy Polk for excellent research assistance; and Kathryn Hensiak for 
additional research support. 
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ited partnership and business trust.  These business forms may be usher-
ing in a new age of the “uncorporation.”1
The basic claim that the emergence of new business forms, coupled to the res-
urrection of older forms, might portend the end of the corporation’s hegemony 
is certainly plausible.  Regarding business trusts, however, the specific claims, 
though often repeated, are misleading in two important respects. 
First, the characterization of the past 200 years as being dominated by 
corporation unfairly diminishes the historic role of the business trust.  In the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, before the corporate form had matured, the com-
mon-law business trust (also known as the Massachusetts trust because of its 
prevalence there) was a strong competitor to corporation as a mode of business 
organization.2  Thus, in a 1929 article in the Harvard Law Review, it was re-
marked that “modern business has become honey-combed with trusteeship.  
Next to contract, the universal tool, and incorporation, the standard instrument 
of organization, it takes its place wherever the relations to be established are 
too delicate or too novel for these coarser devices.”3  Treatises on the business 
trust proliferated in the early 1900s.4  Rockefeller’s infamous Standard Oil 
Company was organized as a trust, not a corporation.  Trust’s salience as a 
form of business organization during this era explains why today we have anti-
trust law, not competition or monopoly law, as it is known abroad.5
Second, today’s common-law business trust is not more flexible than the 
common-law business trust of yore.  On the contrary, in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s, the flexibility of the common-law business trust was widely re-
marked as its chief virtue.  For example, in the 1929 article mentioned in the 
prior paragraph, Professor Isaacs wrote that “[f]oremost among the advantages 
of trusteeship over the standardized legal devices is its flexibility.”6   
To be sure, the proliferation of business trust statutes—in particular the 
1988 Delaware Business Trust Act (which has since been recast as the Dela-
ware Statutory Trust Act)7—has wrought significant change in the law of busi-
ness trusts.  But the entity that arises under those statutes might better be 
thought of as the “statutory business trust.”  It is useful to distinguish the 
common-law business trust from the statutory business trust, because what I 
am calling the statutory business trust appears to differ, by design, on several 
margins from the common-law business trust.  The statutory business trust is 
not only exceedingly flexible, but more importantly it resolves the problems of 
 1. Brochure, Uncorporation: A New Age?, University of Illinois College of Law (on file with the Uni-
versity of Illinois Law Review). 
 2. See 16A JENNIFER L. BERGER & CAROL A. JONES, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 8227 (rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter FLETCHER]. 
 3. Nathan Isaacs, Note, Trusteeship in Modern Business, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1060–61 (1929). 
 4. See WILLIAM C. DUNN, TRUSTS FOR BUSINESS PURPOSES (1922); JOHN H. SEARS, TRUST ESTATES 
AS BUSINESS COMPANIES (2d ed. 1921); SYDNEY R. WRIGHTINGTON, THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED 
ASSOCIATIONS AND BUSINESS TRUSTS (2d ed. 1923); see also GUY A. THOMPSON, BUSINESS TRUSTS AS 
SUBSTITUTES FOR BUSINESS CORPORATIONS (1920). 
 5. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 34–35, 38–39 (2d ed. 2001). 
 6. See Isaacs, supra note 3, at 1052. 
 7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801–3862 (2001). 
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limited liability and spotty judicial recognition that have cast a pall over the 
use of the common-law business trust.8
My point in criticizing the conference brochure is not to undermine the 
conference’s mission, but rather to drive home the point that domestic business 
law scholars have a stunning lack of familiarity with the business trust.  There 
is very little modern scholarship on business trusts.9  None of the leading case-
books on “business organizations” or “business associations” covers the busi-
ness trust at all.10  Though perhaps ironic, the errors in the brochure for this 
conference on alternative forms of business organization are symptomatic of a 
larger pathology. 
Readers familiar with the domestic law school curriculum might assume 
that, because trusts and estates is a separate course from business organiza-
tions, the business trust has become the purview of trusts and estates scholars.  
It has not.  Trusts and estates is organized as a coherent field around gratuitous 
wealth transfer.  Trusts and estates scholars have therefore focused on the trust 
as an instrument of gratuitous transfer, not as a mode of business organiza-
tion.11  Leading trusts and estates casebooks offer little to no coverage of the 
commercial uses of trust law; one of the two leading trust law treatises and the 
2003 Restatement (Third) of Trusts expressly exclude the business trust alto-
gether; and in a recent article on “trends in American trust law,” Edward Hal-
bach, the Reporter for the Third Restatement, discusses only trends in donative 
trust law.12
 8. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New Corporate Law, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 325, 326, 332 (2001) (citing Herbert B. Chermiside, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of the 
Massachusetts or Business Trust, 88 A.L.R.3D 704 (1978 & Supp. 2004)); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, 
The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 474 
(1998). 
 9. The academic literature appears to be limited to the following: Frankel, supra note 8; John H. Lang-
bein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997); Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 568–
69 (2003); see also Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 8, at 466–69, 472–78; Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs 
Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 681 (2004) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Agency]; George G. Triantis, 
Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Com-
mercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1143 (2004). 
 10. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSI-
NESS ORGANIZATION (2003); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2000); THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS 
AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003); WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER 
& STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, 
AND CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 2003); CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (4th ed. 2003); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSOU, BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS (4th ed. 2003); D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: 
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES (2004).  The only book of this sort that has any coverage of the busi-
ness trust is WILLIAM A. GREGORY & THOMAS R. HURST, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 786–
800 (2d ed. 2002). 
 11. The principal exception is Langbein, supra note 9. 
 12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. b (2003); ROGER W. ANDERSEN & IRA MARK 
BLOOM, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES (2d ed. 2002); ELIAS CLARK ET AL., GRATUITOUS 
TRANSFERS (4th ed. 1999); JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS (2d ed. 2003); JESSE DUKEMINIER & 
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES (6th ed. 2000); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., PROBLEMS 
AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS’ ESTATES AND TRUSTS (6th ed. 2000); 1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. 
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.2 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter SCOTT ON TRUSTS]; VALERIE J. VOLLMAR ET 
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So the business trust is something of an orphan in the domestic legal 
academy.13  Those who study business law tend not to give it much attention, 
perhaps assuming that it falls within the purview of the trust scholars.  Like-
wise, those who study trust law have cast it aside as the province of the busi-
ness law scholars.  Of course, showing the existence of a scholarly and teach-
ing lacuna, without more, is not terribly interesting.  Such lacunas abound.  
The crucial question is whether the academy’s inattention to the business trust 
is justifiable. 
In an important recent article, John Langbein persuasively showed that 
the answer to this question is No, a conclusion seconded in a subsequent article 
by Steven Schwarcz.14  The business trust is widely used in structured finance 
transactions, and more than half of all mutual funds are organized as trusts.15  
These activities measure in the trillions of dollars.  What is more, federal law 
imposes a trust form on employee pension funds, which also measure in the 
trillions of dollars.  To put those figures in perspective, in 2001 the capitaliza-
tion of the entire domestic public stock market topped out at $14.72 trillion.16
A further indication of the timeliness of academic scrutiny is the forma-
tion in 2003 of a drafting committee for a Uniform Business Trust Act by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law.17  The rele-
vance for that project of a better understanding of the uses and nature of the 
business trust as configured under existing state statutes is manifest.18
Accordingly, this essay outlines a research agenda for the study of the 
trust—in particular, the statutory trust—as a mode of business organization.  I 
focus on the statutory business trust for two reasons.19  First, the business trust 
statutes appear to have been designed to perfect, and so to replace, the com-
mon-law business trust.  Second, preliminary data that I have collected and am 
refining for presentation in a future study indicate that the statutory business 
trust has begun to supplant the common-law business trust in practice.20   
AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES (2003); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY 
PROPERTY LAW (3d ed. 2002); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American 
Trust Law at Century’s End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1881 (2000); see also GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS (7th ed. 2001).  The Dukeminier text allots a few pages to this topic in the 
forthcoming seventh edition.  JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES (7th ed. forthcoming 
2005). 
 13. On the position of the business trust abroad, see infra Part VI. 
 14. Langbein, supra note 9, at 165–67; Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 559. 
 15. Langbein, supra note 9, at 171. 
 16. See SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, 2002 SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 6 (2002), available at 
http://www.sia.com/research/pdf/2002Fact_Book.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2004). 
 17. Press Release, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, New Drafting 
Committees to be Appointed (Jan. 24, 2003), at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopModules/ 
NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemID=94 (last visited Sept. 17, 2004).  In January 2005, the draft act was recast as the 
Uniform Statutory Trust Act and the drafting committee was renamed accordingly. 
 18. Although the author serves as the Reporter for the Uniform Statutory Trust Act, the views expressed 
in this essay are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Uniform Law 
Commissioners or the drafting committee. 
 19. For an examination of both as modes of business organization, see generally Schwarcz, supra note 
9. 
 20. This work-in-progress is tentatively titled “The Rise of the Statutory Business Trust.” 
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Put into the parlance of this conference, this essay is a call for research on 
the statutory business trust as uncorporation.  To that end, this essay suggests 
five lines of inquiry for future research: 
1. the rise of the statutory business trust as a form of business or-
ganization; 
2. the jurisdictional competition between the states over statutory 
business trusts; 
3. empirical investigation of the statutory business trust phenome-
non; 
4. examination of why trust continues to abide as a form of busi-
ness organization now that we have enabling corporation law, 
and why corporation emerged when we already had highly 
flexible trust law; and 
5. comparative analysis of trust as a business organization within 
and without the rest of the common-law world. 
Each of those lines of inquiry, which overlap (especially items 1 and 4) 
and are not exhaustive, are commented upon in the remainder of this essay.  It 
must be remembered, however, that this essay sets forth a call for research on, 
and some discussion of, those questions.  It is not a proper engagement of any 
of them. 
II. THE STATUTORY BUSINESS TRUST 
The first line of suggested inquiry is the rise of the statutory business 
trust as a form of business organization.  Numerous research questions abound.  
To begin with, it would be useful simply to collect the business trust statutes 
and then to impose some kind of taxonomy upon them.  The existing literature, 
such as it is, puts the count of states with general business trust legislation 
anywhere from seventeen to thirty-four.21  Based on fresh electronic searches, I 
put the current count at twenty-nine.22  The oldest is the Massachusetts statute, 
 21. See Langbein, supra note 9, at 187–88 (listing seventeen) (citing Irving S. Schloss, Some Undiscov-
ered Country: The Business Trust and Estate Planning, 22 TAX MGM’T EST. GIFTS & TR. J. 83, 83 (1997)); 
Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 421, 431–32 n.69 (1988) (listing nineteen); Takemi Ueno, Comment, Defining a “Business Trust”: 
Proposed Amendment of Section 101(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499 app. (1993) (list-
ing thirty-four). 
 22. See ALA. CODE §§ 19-3-60 to -328 (1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1871 to -1879 (West 
2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 34-500 to -547 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801–3862 (2001); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 609.01–.08 (West 2001); IND. CODE §§ 23-5-1-1 to -11 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-2027 
to -2038 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 386.370–.440 (Michie 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS 
§§ 12-101 to -810 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 182, §§ 1–14 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 318.01–.06 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-15-1 to -139 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-5-101 to -
204 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. 88A.010–.930 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 293-B:1 to -B:23 (1999); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 39-44 to -49 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1746.01–.99 (Anderson 2004); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 60, §§ 171–181 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 128.560–.600 (2003); 15 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 9501–9507 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-53-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op. 
1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-14-1 to -12 (Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-201 to -207 
(2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-101 to -110 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1 to -200 (Michie 1999); 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23.90.010–.900 (West 1994); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 47-9A-1 to -5 (Michie 1999 & 
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which dates from 1909.  The youngest is the Virginia statute, which took effect 
in 2003.  In addition, as indicated above, a uniform act is in the works. 
A glance at the enactment dates of the statutes reveals that there was a 
flurry of business trust legislation in the early 1960s, and then again in the 
wake of the Delaware Business Trust Act of 1988.  This suggests that there are 
perhaps as many as four generations of business trust legislation:  the first 
comprises the older statutes such as the Massachusetts act; the second com-
prises those that were enacted in the 1960s flurry; the third comprises the legis-
lation passed in the 1980s but before the Delaware Act; and the fourth com-
prises the Delaware Act and the Delaware-style statutes that have been enacted 
since 1988. 
What was the motivation for these enactments?  The leading practitioner 
commentary on the Delaware Act tells us that the “principal purpose of the 
[statute is] to recognize the statutory trust as an alternative form of business 
organization.”23  Why was that desirable?  To the extent that there is literature 
on the subject, it tells us that, at common law, “business trusts posed a number 
of potential legal uncertainties.”24  Some states refused to recognize the valid-
ity of business trusts on the ground that they amounted to an impermissible 
evasion of local corporate law.25  A further problem was the lack of statutory 
recognition of limited liability for investors.26  Even in jurisdictions that rec-
ognized the legality of the business trust, courts sometimes held the beneficial 
owners liable for the debts of the enterprise.27  The question thus arises, do the 
business trust statutes merely resolve those problems, or did the legislatures 
use the occasion of codification to improve and to innovate? 
There is an irony, plain to those who study donative trusts, to the use of 
the trust as a form of business organization:  the traditional prudence-based 
conception of the duty of care in trust law forbade entrepreneurial activity.  
The 1959 Second Restatement provides that the “employment of trust property 
in the carrying on of trade or business” is per se imprudent unless expressly 
authorized by the trust instrument.28  Yet most of the modern business trust 
statutes provide that, in the event of statutory silence or a gap in the trust in-
Supp. 2003); WIS. STAT. § 226.14 (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-23-101 to -202 (Michie 2003).  This 
count includes only states with a general business trust statute, thereby excluding states with specialized real 
estate investment trust statutes or simple definitional provisions. 
 23. Wendell Fenton & Eric A. Mazie, Delaware Statutory Trusts, in THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 19.2 (9th ed. 2004 Supp.); see also C. Porter Vaughan, III et 
al., Corporate and Business Law, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002). 
 24. Frankel, supra note 8, at 326 (citing Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of the 
Massachusetts or Business Trust, 88 A.L.R.3D 704 (1978 & Supp. 2004); see also FLETCHER, supra note 2, 
§ 8233; Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 8, at 474. 
 25. See Leland S. Duxbury, Business Trusts and Blue Sky Laws, 8 MINN. L. REV. 465, 475–76 (1924). 
 26. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 8, at 474–75. 
 27. Id. 
 28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. f (1959).  For comparison of the duty of care in trust 
law and corporate law, see Sitkoff, Agency, supra note 9, at 654–57; Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate 
Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 574–76 (2003) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Trust Law]. 
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strument, the common law of trusts applies.29  True, the default rule of the 
Second Restatement against operating a business has been replaced with a 
more permissive standard.30  But that is a recent development.  The general 
point is that, by providing for trust law to fill the gaps, the modern statutes ap-
pear to incorporate the stricter fiduciary standards of trust law instead of corpo-
rate law’s more relaxed approach. 
This raises the broader question of mismatch between traditional trust 
law, which evolved in the context of donative transfers, and the exigencies of 
enterprise organization.31  In addition to differences in fiduciary standards, un-
der traditional trust law principles managerial action requires unanimity among 
the trustees;32 the trustee is to act impartially with respect to different classes 
of beneficiaries;33 and the Rule Against Perpetuities sets a limit (albeit indi-
rect) on trust duration.34  Each of those principles is contrary to the analogous 
rule in corporate law.  Managerial action almost never requires unanimity; re-
sidual equity claimants are usually preferred over debt and other equity claim-
ants;35 and corporations have perpetual life. 
The modern business trust statutes have provisions that speak to some of 
these issues, such as derivative suits and perpetual life.36  It seems unlikely, 
however, that the statutes address all instances of mismatch.  Indeed, trust 
law’s more rigorous duties of loyalty and care, which evolved in the donative 
context,37 appear to be incorporated by reference by the modern business trust 
statutes.  As noted above, most of the recent statutes provide that the common 
 29. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-519 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 12, § 3809 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., 
CORPS. & ASS’NS § 12-102(a) (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. 88A.160(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-B:10 
(1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-14A-42 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-23-113 (Mi-
chie 2003).  A further puzzle:  the 1960s wave of business trust legislation provides that corporate law applies 
in the event of statutory silence and a gap in the trust instrument.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1879 (West 
2004); IND. CODE § 23-5-1-9 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2035 (1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-15-29 
(2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-5-103 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 128.580 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-101-
207 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 23.90.040(4) (1994); W. VA. CODE § 47-9A-4(a) (1999). 
 30. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(e) (1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT 
INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt. f (1992). 
 31. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 575–79 (discussing general governance of trusts and corpo-
rations). 
 32. The unanimity rule is on the decline.  See Sitkoff, Agency, supra note 9, at 656 n.176 (collecting 
authority).  For application to business trusts, see FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 8251. 
 33. For discussion and references on the duty of impartiality and the contrary corporate law rule, see 
Sitkoff, Agency, supra note 9, at 650–52; see also Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 579. 
 34. Recently, however, there has been considerable erosion of the common-law rule.  See Jesse Duke-
minier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1304 (2003); see also Joel 
C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 601, 631 (2000); Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Per-
petuities: R.I.P. for The R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2097 (2003). 
 35. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 10, § 6.3.1 (discussing corporate law’s favoritism of residual 
claimants); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 7.4, (2002) (same); see also 
Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 578–80. 
 36. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 34-522, -518 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3816, 3808 (2001); NEV. 
REV. STAT. 88A.410, .260 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 293-B:18, -B:9 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§§ 47-14A-72 to -76, -14A-35 to -36 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1232 to -1233, -
1218 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-23-120, -112 (Michie 2003). 
 37. See Sitkoff, Agency, supra note 9, at 654–57 (care); Sitkoff, Trust Law, supra note 28, at 572–76 
(loyalty and care). 
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law of trusts applies unless otherwise displaced by a specific statutory provi-
sion or the terms of the trust instrument. 
Another important task that falls within this line of inquiry is to ascertain 
what the statutory business trust is used for.  A leading compendium on busi-
ness law states that “the motivation for organizing these trusts has largely dis-
appeared.  This topic is largely of historical interest today.”38  This is demon-
strably wrong; the six states that have enacted Delaware-style acts since 1988, 
and the Uniform Law Commissioners, are not tilting at windmills.39
One common use of the statutory business trust is in the organization of 
mutual funds.40  Many well-known mutual funds, for example some sponsored 
by Vanguard and TIAA-CREF, are organized as statutory business trusts.41  
Another use of the statutory business trust is in structured finance transac-
tions—in particular, asset securitization.42  These industries measure in the tril-
lions of dollars. 
If structured finance and mutual funds represent its primary uses, then it 
would appear that the modern statutory business trust is used mainly as an en-
tity of convenience that is adapted by its users to comport with federal tax, 
bankruptcy, and securities laws such as the Investment Company Act of 
1940.43  In more general terms, this means that the statutory business trust has 
been used chiefly for issuing passive equitable participation rights over asset 
pools or funds that are in turn subject to external regulatory limitations.  This 
analysis is consistent with the otherwise puzzling experience that, despite there 
being trillions of dollars in statutory business trusts, I could find only one re-
ported decision under the Delaware business trust statute.44  To the extent that 
in practice substantive regulation of statutory business trusts is supplied by 
other law, there is no inconsistency with this lack of case law and my prelimi-
nary empirical finding, which will be presented more formally in a future pa-
per, that Delaware is the leading jurisdiction for statutory business trusts. 
The suggestion that the statutory business trust is used mainly as a malle-
able entity of convenience may also explain why more has not been made of its 
 38. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 8232. 
 39. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-500 to -547 (1997); MD. CODE  ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 12-101 to -
810 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. 88A.010–.910 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 293-B:1 to -B:23 (1999); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-14A-72 to -76, -14A-35 to -36 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-
1200 to -1284 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2004). 
 40. See Philip H. Newman, Legal Considerations in Forming a Mutual Fund (ALI-ABA Course of 
Study 2002). 
 41. See Declaration of Trust of TIAA-CREF Mutual Fund (Feb. 19, 1997); Amendment and Declaration 
of Trust of Vanguard Treasury Fund (Sept. 13, 1996). 
 42. See Langbein, supra note 9, at 172–73; Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 564–68, 573.  On securitization, 
see COMMITTEE ON BANKR. & CORP. REORGANIZATION, ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, New 
Developments in Structured Finance, 56 BUS. LAW. 95 (2000); Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost 
Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitiza-
tion, 1 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994); see also Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitiza-
tion and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161 (2005). 
 43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2000 & Supp. I 2001). 
 44. Nakahara v. NS 1991 Am. Trust, 739 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1998); see also Simon v. Navellier Series 
Fund, No. 17734, 2000 WL 1597890 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2000). 
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extreme freedom of contract.  The Delaware-style acts state that their underly-
ing policy is to “give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract 
and to the enforceability of governing instruments.”45  Taken literally, several 
appear to authorize indemnification of the trustees for even willful breach of 
duty.46  To put this in context, under Delaware corporate law, indemnification 
of corporate managers typically requires that they have acted in good faith.47  
Likewise, although the common law of trusts permits indemnification and ex-
culpation clauses, a total exoneration from all fiduciary obligations—that is, 
authorization of a bad faith trusteeship—is forbidden.48
Close examination of the various state statutory regimes, the uses to 
which the statutory business trust has been put, and a sampling of exemplary 
declarations of trust will no doubt help resolve some of the many open issues 
regarding the nature and function of the statutory business trust.  Also helpful 
in getting at those issues will be an examination of the political economy of the 
business trust statutes.  This point segues nicely into the next line of inquiry—
regulatory competition. 
III. REGULATORY COMPETITION 
The second line of suggested inquiry is the regulatory competition be-
tween the states over statutory business trusts.  Regulatory competition, some-
times called jurisdictional competition, refers to the phenomenon in which 
lawmakers try to attract business to their jurisdiction by providing a regulatory 
environment that is favorable to the business being wooed.49  The idea, which 
is thought to have been identified first by Charles Tiebout, is that firms can 
“vote with their feet,” moving from one jurisdiction to another based on 
changes in the local regulatory climate.50  Thanks to American federalism, this 
phenomenon can manifest domestically between the states to the extent a field 
is not entirely preempted by federal law.  Though regulatory competition has 
 45. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-546 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3823(b) (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 
88A.160 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-B:1 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-14A-95 (Michie 2003); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1282(B) (Michie 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-23-302(b) (Michie 2003); see also 15 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9502(e) (West 1995 & Supp. 2004). 
 46. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-524 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3806, 3817 (2001); NEV. 
REV. STAT. 88A.400 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-14A-77 to -78 (Michie 2003); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 13.1-697 (Michie 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-23-121 (Michie 2003).  In the only reported case under the 
Delaware act, the court denied the trustees’ claim for indemnification on the ground of unclean hands.  Naka-
hara, 739 A.2d at 772. 
 47. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001); Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., 88 F.3d 87, 89 (2d 
Cir. 1996); Mayer v. Executive Telecard, Ltd., 705 A.2d 220, 225 (Del. Ch. 1997); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 
36, § 6.6. 
 48. See McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008, 7C U.L.A. 258 
(Supp. 2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959); Sitkoff, Agency, supra note 9, at 642–46. 
 49. For an introductory discussion, see Konstantine Gatsios & Peter Holmes, Regulatory Competition, 
in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 271, 271–75 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 50. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
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been studied perhaps most famously in corporate law,51 it also manifests itself 
in numerous other fields such as securities, bankruptcy, environmental, tax, se-
cured transactions, welfare, and antitrust law, to name just a few.52  Applica-
tion of regulatory competition theory to statutory business trusts raises both 
positive and normative questions. 
In the wake of Delaware’s enactment of a business trust statute in 1988, 
several other states enacted statutes modeled on the Delaware Act.  The posi-
tive task is to ascertain why.  Aside from insignificant filing fees, statutory 
business trusts do not pay regular franchise fees.  Hence discerning the driving 
force behind regulatory competition over statutory business trusts will require 
greater subtlety than the standard franchise-fee account of corporate regulatory 
competition.53  The interesting positive inquiry, in other words, will be to as-
certain the political economy of the modern statutes.  One might predict that it 
will prove to be lawyer-driven.54  News accounts suggest that lawyers lobby 
for business trust legislation on the ground that such legislation is necessary for 
the state to remain competitive.55  In a similar vein, it will be interesting to 
study what role, if any, the uniform act will play.56
Two further wrinkles regarding the use of business trusts for organizing 
mutual funds are worth mentioning.  First, in this context, the business trust 
 51. The classics are Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977), and William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections 
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). 
 52. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 679, 682–84 (2002) (collecting examples).  The phenomenon has been shown to exist with respect to 
donative trusts—to the tune of $100 billion.  See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Com-
petition in Trust Law: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=666481. 
 53. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6–12, 15–16 (1993).  For 
criticism of the traditional account, see Kahan & Kamar, supra note 52, at 687–94; Robert H. Sitkoff, Corpo-
rate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1103, 1143 (2002) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech]; Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 52. 
 54. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Dela-
ware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987) (arguing that Delaware lawyers, as a dominant interest 
group in that state, will continue to shape and benefit from Delaware corporate law); see also Larry E. Rib-
stein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 327–33 (2004). 
 55. See Dominic Bencivenga, Push to Modernize: Lawyers See Need for Competitive Business Laws, 
219 N.Y. L.J. 5 (1998) (“Delaware, Maryland and other states already have a business trust statute and attor-
neys say New York needs one to be competitive.”); Paul Frisman, In the Nick of Time, CONN. L. TRIB., May 
13, 1996, at 1 (stating that “certain financing transactions, although possible . . . under common law, have of-
ten gone out of state, or relied on the services of out-of-state parties”). 
 56. There is a significant literature on the economics of uniform lawmaking.  See, e.g., John Linarelli, 
The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1387 (2003); Kathleen Patchel, 
Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of 
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL. STUD. 131 (1996); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Law, 
Model Laws and Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 947 (1995); Edward Rubin, Efficiency, 
Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. 
Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The 
Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in 
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149–92 (Jody S. Kraus & Ste-
ven D. Walt eds., 2000). 
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appears also to compete with the Maryland corporation.57  So this is an exam-
ple of both interstate and interentity competition, one that might be amenable 
to formal empirical analysis.58  Second, mutual funds are subject to extensive 
federal regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and other secu-
rities laws.59  This raises the question of what exactly is left for the states to 
compete over.60  That is an important positive question with implications for 
the normative analysis.  Consider again the broad indemnification provisions 
discussed earlier.  To the extent that those provisions are preempted by federal 
law (and with respect to mutual funds, they probably are), they cannot serve as 
examples of a race to the top or a race to the bottom. 
Turning to the normative analysis, the first step will be to ascertain the 
descriptive accuracy of my suggestion that the statutory business trust is used 
primarily as a vehicle for compliance with external regulatory regimes.  If that 
is correct, then classical race to the top and race to the bottom considerations 
seem inapplicable, as the states are not providing substantive rules of govern-
ance.  At its most extreme, this view would imply that the states are not really 
supplying competing forms of regulation. 
On the other hand, if the substantive state law of statutory business trusts 
does matter (perhaps the federal regulatory overlay is not entirely preclusive), 
then at least two consequences follow.  First, the substantive choices of the 
Uniform Law Commissioners in the design of the uniform act will be of con-
siderable import, not only substantively if it is widely adopted, but also to the 
initial question of whether the uniform act will be adopted in the first place.  If 
the substance matters, then the relevant interest group(s) that drive(s) the regu-
latory competition will have a keen interest in the content of the act. 
Second, if the substance matters, then the difficult inquiry for the norma-
tive analysis will be to ascertain the motives of the relevant lawmakers.  Put 
differently, what are the incentives of those who drive the legislative process 
concerning business trust statutes?  If the process is driven by those who use 
the statutory business trust in order to sell interests in public or private capital 
markets—for example, in an asset securitization transaction—a race to the bot-
tom does not necessarily follow.  Those actors have a powerful incentive to 
lobby for statutory terms, and to offer provisions in their trust instruments, that 
investors find favorable.  Provided that investors are aware of problematic pro-
 57. See Newman, supra note 39; Theo Francis, Shareholders, Fund Firms Debate Maryland Law, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2001, at C1. 
 58. See infra Part IV. 
 59. See Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1469 (1991); Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161 (2004); 
see also Victoria E. Schonfeld & Thomas M. J. Kerwin, Organization of a Mutual Fund, 49 BUS. LAW. 107, 
109 (1993). 
 60. On the relevance of federal regulation, or the threat of federal regulation, to regulatory competition, 
see Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).  In an earlier article I suggested that 
the threat of increased federal incursions into corporate law curtailed Delaware’s lawmaking discretion.  Sit-
koff, Corporate Political Speech, supra note 53, at 1146. 
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visions (always the crucial qualification), they will discount accordingly the 
price that they are willing to pay for interests affected by those provisions.61
IV. EMPIRICAL INQUIRY 
The third line of suggested inquiry is empirical, and once again research 
questions abound.  Statutory business trusts are required to register with the 
state in which they are formed.  Hence it should be possible to obtain from the 
various state registry offices the number of statutory business trusts in each 
state.  This data, which as noted earlier I have begun to collect and am refining 
for presentation in future work, should be helpful for at least two purposes. 
First, this data should provide an initial measure, albeit somewhat raw, of 
the relative positions of the states in the regulatory competition over statutory 
business trusts.  On this question my preliminary data indicate that Delaware 
dominates the field by an order of magnitude.  In a similar vein, this data 
should also provide an indication of the market’s assessment of the relative 
worth of the different generations of business trusts.  Again, my preliminary 
data indicate that the Delaware-style statutory trusts are on the ascendancy 
(Connecticut, in particular, appears to be experiencing significant growth).  
This comports with the observation that lawyers in states without a Delaware-
style business trust statute are lobbying for one.  Potential further refinements 
include weighting the number of trusts by their aggregate size and disaggre-
gating the data to specify how many were used for mutual funds, structured fi-
nance, or other purposes, though this more refined data may not be available.  
In any event, this sort of empirical analysis might provide additional insights 
into whether there is anything inherent to mutual funds and structured finance 
that causes one entity to be a good fit for both.62
Second, this data should facilitate basic comparative study of the statu-
tory business trust and other forms of business association.  My preliminary 
data indicate that, in the aggregate, the total number of corporations vastly ex-
ceed the total number of statutory business trusts.  This is consistent with the 
idea that the latter are used primarily as specialized entities for asset pooling, 
not for operating enterprises more generally. 
Another useful set of data would be the aggregate volume, in dollars, of 
business conducted by statutory business trusts.  Even if the total number of 
statutory business trusts may be small in comparison to the number of corpora-
tions, it does not necessarily follow that the number of dollars in statutory 
business trusts are few.  On the contrary, John Langbein has identified trillions 
of dollars of commercial trust business,63 a fair share of which makes use of 
 61. The seminal discussion of managerial incentives at the moment the firm goes public is Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 313 (1976). 
 62. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 583–84 (discussing when business planners should use 
trusts). 
 63. See Langbein, supra note 9, at 178. 
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the statutory business trust.  Asset securitization and mutual funds are big busi-
ness. 
Another potentially fruitful empirical study would be a survey of a repre-
sentative sample of statutory business trust declarations of trust.64  A potential 
problem here is that obtaining exemplary instruments for private statutory 
business trusts may be difficult.  It appears, however, that in its most important 
uses—mutual funds and structured finance—statutory business trusts often is-
sue publicly-traded shares.  As a result, under various federal securities laws, 
the declarations of trust for those entities are publicly disclosed. 
Moving beyond these initial approaches, more formal empirical study 
may be feasible.  Recall that the statutory business trust competes with the 
Maryland corporation as the preferred form of organization for mutual funds.  
Perhaps the selection of one form or the other impacts fund value.  Especially 
if there are events such as the reorganization of a fund from one to the other, it 
may be possible to test formally the impact, if any, that choice of entity has on 
fund value. 
V. TRUST VS. CORPORATION 
The fourth line of suggested inquiry is an examination of trust versus 
corporation.  Why does trust continue to abide as a form of business organiza-
tion even after we developed enabling corporation law?  Why did enabling 
corporate codes emerge when we already had highly flexible trust law?  Why 
does corporation trounce trust for the organization of operating enterprises?  
Why is trust preferred in certain niches such as mutual funds and structured fi-
nance?  Thus far, we have only preliminary answers to these questions.  Yet 
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and Richard Squire are probably correct 
in remarking elsewhere in this issue that “[i]n theory, any entity that can be 
formed as a business corporation, an LLC, an LLP, or an LLLP could be 
formed instead as a statutory business trust.”65  If so, we are left with the puz-
zle of why the business corporation, LLC, LLP, and LLLP continue to domi-
nate the statutory business trust for the organization of operating enterprises. 
Others have flagged this question: 
• “There are not even clear answers to the fundamental question of 
whether trusts are a better form of business organization than cor-
porations or partnerships.”—Steven Schwarcz (2003).66 
• “Given the existence of the trust, why does one need the corporate 
form?”—Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei (1998).67 
 64. See generally Sitkoff, Trust Law, supra note 28, at 587–88. 
 65. Henry Hansmann et al., The New Entities in Historical Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 14.  A 
related question is how to fit the rise of the statutory business trust within recent calls for entity rationalization.  
See, e.g., Symposium, Entity Rationalization: What Can or Should be Done About the Proliferation of Busi-
ness Organizations (pts. 1 & 2), 58 BUS. LAW. 1003, 1385 (2003). 
 66. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 560 (footnotes omitted). 
 67. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 8, at 473. 
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• “The ultimate challenge of this intriguing topic is to explain when 
and why trust dominates corporation for particular commercial 
tasks.”—John Langbein (1997).68 
Schwarcz, Hansmann and Mattei, and Langbein each make contributions to-
ward understanding the nature of the competition between trust and corpora-
tion as alternative modes of business organization.69  But more work remains 
to be done, including the development of a persuasive positive account of the 
evolutionary competition between trust and corporation and then a normative 
account of whether the current equilibrium is efficient. 
The standard account of the history of trust versus corporation is that trust 
was used in the late 1800s and early 1900s primarily as a means to escape arbi-
trary regulatory limits in state corporate codes.  This use of the trust was espe-
cially pronounced in Massachusetts, which forbade corporate ownership of real 
estate.  The term “Massachusetts trust” thus emerged as a synonym for busi-
ness trust.70  Over time, however, corporate law became increasingly enabling 
and permissive.  As corporate law’s regulatory limits fell away, so did the 
principal rationale for using trust rather than corporation. 
The defect in this account is that it assumes the superiority of the corpo-
rate form.  Trust was used only because of imperfections with corporation, and 
once those imperfections were resolved, corporation prevailed.  Because this 
account assumes the inevitability of corporate hegemony, it tells us nothing 
about why corporation prevails for operating enterprises but not in the various 
niches, such as mutual funds and structured finance, where trust prevails.  Why 
did mutual funds, which began in the 1920s; indenture trusts, which took mod-
ern form in 1939; the pension trust, which took off after World War II; real es-
tate investment trusts, which took off in the 1960s; and asset securitization, 
which took off in the 1970s, embrace trust instead of corporation?71
Perhaps a more fruitful approach would be to develop an evolutionary 
theory of trust and corporation as competing business entities.72  Capital mar-
kets drive the selection process.  To the extent that managers must appeal to 
capital markets for financing, they will have an incentive to choose the form of 
organization that maximizes investor return.73  Mutation takes the form of 
change in the relevant law—state corporate law, state trust law, federal tax law, 
or federal bankruptcy law.  If a mutation better equips one form to poach turf, 
or to protect its turf, from the other, then by causing the mutation lawmakers 
(legislative or judicial) upset the prior equilibrium.  The new equilibrium that 
emerges reflects the revised balance of relative costs and benefits to the use of 
one or the other in the relevant business environment.  Viewed in this manner, 
 68. Langbein, supra note 9, at 189. 
 69. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 8, at 472–78; Langbein, supra note 9, at 179–85; Schwarcz, 
supra note 9, at 573–85. 
 70. See Wheeler A. Rosenbalm, The Massachusetts Trust, 31 TENN. L. REV. 471, 471 (1964). 
 71. This listing comes from Langbein, supra note 9, at 189. 
 72. Langbein’s arresting characterization of the trust as being “locked in a struggle for turf” with corpo-
ration fits nicely into the evolutionary paradigm.  Id. at 186–87. 
 73. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 61. 
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the relative positions of trust and corporation reflect the tightness of fit, subject 
to switching costs, of their innate characteristics—their default rules under 
state law as well as their treatment by federal tax and bankruptcy law—and the 
uses to which they have been put.74
A better positive understanding of the competition between trust and cor-
poration will lead to a better normative analysis of whether the current equilib-
rium is inefficient in any meaningful sense.  In discussion at conferences and 
elsewhere, others have suggested that the story is one of path dependence.  
Even if the current equilibrium is in large part an artifact of history, however, it 
does not necessarily follow that the current equilibrium is inefficient.  Path de-
pendence does not always indicate an efficiency loss:  nicknames and the side 
on which one parts one’s hair are nice examples.75  Still, it is possible that the 
Delaware-style statutory business trust offers advantages that in practice are 
being eschewed as a result of the related phenomena of network externalities 
and status quo bias.76  This idea is worth further consideration.  Regardless of 
whether trust and corporation join the (probably apocryphal) tales of the com-
petition between QWERTY and Dvorak keyboards, and Betamax and VHS re-
corders,77 a possible further contribution of this approach is that it might speak 
to the importance of default rules and the transaction costs of opting out of 
(possibly suboptimal) defaults. 
Another factor worth examining is agency costs in the legal market; it 
may well be that the identity of one’s lawyer drives the decision of whether to 
make use of a corporation or a Delaware statutory (or a Massachusetts com-
mon-law) trust.  As John Coates, Robert Daines, and Guhan Subramanian have 
each shown in other corporate contexts, choice of lawyer can have a significant 
impact on transactional structure.78  An analogy to health care is instructive.  
Whether you take antibiotic A or B to fight an infection is almost always de-
termined by your physician’s preference for A or B. 
 74. This suggestion is not incompatible with the traditional account.  See Hansmann & Mattei, supra 
note 8, at 472–78; Langbein, supra note 9, at 179–85; Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 573–81. 
 75. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership 
and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 131–32 (1999); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Depend-
ence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 206–08 (1995). 
 76. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 
CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Russell Korobkin, The Status 
Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998). 
 77. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 75.  Compare Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of 
Qwerty, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985) (finding path dependency in the keyboard market), with S.J. Liebowitz 
& Stephen Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990) (rejecting path dependency in the key-
board market). 
 78. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 1301 (2001); Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1580–82 
(2002); Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory, Evidence & Policy (Harvard Law & Econ. 
Discussion Paper No. 472, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=530284 (last visited Aug. 24, 2004). 
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VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Despite differences in the doctrinal details,79 there is a growing global 
consensus on the nature and purpose of corporate organization, including the 
primacy of long-term shareholder value.80  This consensus raises the interest-
ing question of how the domestic competition between trust and corporation 
fits, if at all, within a global context.81  Here there are at least two potential 
avenues that warrant further research. 
First, what of the competition between trust and corporation elsewhere in 
the common-law world?  The business trust has had more prominence in the 
English and commonwealth literature than it has had domestically, but it is un-
clear whether this greater prominence reflects its greater use in those sys-
tems.82  Indeed, as an historical matter, Ron Harris contends that, in England, 
the “trust was by no means an omnipotent device in the context of the unincor-
porated company . . . . It thus did not turn this form of organization into the 
first choice of the business community.”83  Further study of the experience in 
England and the commonwealth is warranted. 
Second, although it is often said that the trust is uniquely Anglo-
American,84 in view of its manifest usefulness in commercial transactions and 
gratuitous transfers, one should approach this claim of uniqueness with some 
skepticism.  If the trust is so useful, would not other legal systems have devel-
oped something similar?  The answer is that they have.  A trust device—the 
fideicommissum—existed in Roman law.  The English judges who developed 
the common-law trust were strongly influenced by the German treuhand.  In 
Hindu law, one finds a trust-like device called benami.  In Islamic law one 
finds the waqf.85  Today there is a Japanese trust law,86 and trust or trust-like 
 79. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 75. 
 80. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439 (2001). 
 81. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: An Invitation to Compara-
tists, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT. L. 321 (2003). 
 82. See, e.g., Michael Bryan, Reflections on Some Commercial Applications of the Trust in Key Devel-
opments, in CORPORATE LAW AND TRUSTS LAW 225–306 (Ian Ramsay ed., 2002); Robert Flannigan, Business 
Applications of the Express Trust, 36 ALTA. L. REV. 630 (1998); David Hayton, The Uses of Trusts in the 
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devices may be found in a host of other countries—including those that follow 
the civil-law tradition.87  In a similar vein, the 1985 Hague Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition was established to provide 
guidance on the recognition of, and choice of law for, trusts in jurisdictions 
that lack a native trust law.88  The question thus arises, is the use of the trust or 
trust-like devices outside of the common-law world primarily donative, com-
mercial, or both?  If there is heavy commercial use, how do these devices in-
teract with the company law of those jurisdictions?  Particularly interesting 
would be a comparison of the entities used abroad in structured finance and 
mutual funds.89
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The aspiration of this special issue, and the symposium on which it is 
based, is to redirect scholarly attention to alternative forms of business organi-
zations—uncorporations.  This effort is laudable.  The recent proliferation of 
new business entities, and the resurrection of older entities such as the business 
trust, is a fascinating development. 
Owing in large part to the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, the common-law 
business trust has been born again as the statutory business trust.  Since 1988, 
six states have enacted Delaware-style business trust legislation.  More are on 
the way.  These acts have solidified the position of the statutory business trust 
as a viable form of business organization, one that is of considerable import in 
the mutual fund and structured finance industries.  As such, the statutory busi-
ness trust has considerable significance for capital markets and commercial 
transactions. 
Despite its extraordinary practical significance, however, the statutory 
business trust has not received much scholarly scrutiny.  Nor is it regularly in-
cluded in the standard teaching materials on business organizations or trust 
law.  This is regrettable, but remediable.  Accordingly, this essay outlined a re-
search agenda for the study of the trust—in particular, the statutory business 
trust—as a form of “uncorporation.” 
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